Inference, exploration and evaluation in early childhood

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, 2012.This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-116).Some of the biggest achievements in our lives are made even before we learn to tie our shoes. Within a few years of life, we master a language, acquire cultural norms, and develop naïve, yet rich, abstract, coherent theories about how the world works. How do young learners achieve such a feat? The goal of my thesis is to lay the groundwork for a unified account of a rational inference mechanism that underlies this remarkable human faculty to learn so much, so fast, from so little. The first study (Chapter 2) provides evidence that 16-month-old infants can use co-variation information among agents and objects to infer the cause of their failed actions; depending on their attribution, infants either approached another agent or another object. The second study (Chapter 3) shows that 15-month-old infants consider both the sample and the sampling process to rationally generalize properties of novel objects in the absence of behavioral cues. The results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a Bayesian model, and suggest that infants' inferences are graded with respect to the probability of the sample. Finally, the third study (Chapter 4) shows that older children make sophisticated inferences about properties of agents; children evaluated an informant based on information he provided, and such evaluations affected how children learned from that informant. These studies provide evidence for rational, probabilistic, domain-general inference mechanisms in preverbal infants, and demonstrate how young learners seamlessly integrate data from different sources in ways that affect their exploration, generalization, and evaluation of both the physical and the social world.by Hyowon Gweon.Ph.D

16-Month-Olds Rationally Infer Causes of Failed Actions

Sixteen-month-old infants (N = 83) rationally used sparse data about the distribution of outcomes among agents and objects to solve a fundamental inference problem: deciding whether event outcomes are due to themselves or the world. When infants experienced failed outcomes, their causal attributions affected whether they sought help or explored.Templeton Foundation (Award)James S. McDonnell FoundationNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF Faculty Early Career Development Award

Means-Inference as a Source of Variability in Early Helping

Humans, as compared to their primate relatives, readily act on behalf of others: we help, inform, share resources with, and provide emotional comfort for others. Although these prosocial behaviors emerge early in life, some types of prosocial behaviors seem to emerge earlier than others, and some tasks elicit more reliable helping than others. Here we discuss existing perspectives on the sources of variability in early prosocial behaviors with a particular focus on the variability within the domain of instrumental helping. We suggest that successful helping behavior not only requires an understanding of others' goals (goal-inference), but also the ability to figure out how to help (means-inference). We review recent work that highlights two key factors that support means-inference: causal reasoning and sensitivity to the expected costs and rewards of actions. Once we begin to look closely at the process of deciding how to help someone, even a seemingly simple helping behavior is, in fact, a consequence of a sophisticated decision-making process; it involves reasoning about others (e.g., goals, actions, and beliefs), about the causal structure of the physical world, and about one's own ability to provide effective help. A finer-grained understanding of the role of these inferences may help explain the developmental trajectory of prosocial behaviors in early childhood. We discuss the promise of computational models that formalize this decision process and how this approach can provide additional insights into why humans show unparalleled propensity and flexibility in their ability to help others

Open dataset of theory of mind reasoning in early to middle childhood

Theory of mind (ToM) reasoning refers to the process by which we reason about the mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions) of others. Here, we describe an open dataset of responses from children who completed a story booklet task for assessing ToM reasoning (n = 321 3–12-year-old children, including 64 (neurotypical) children assessed longitudinally and 68 autistic children). Children completed one of two versions of the story booklet task (Booklet 1 or 2). Both versions include two-alternative forced choice and free response questions that tap ToM concepts ranging in difficulty from reasoning about desires and beliefs to reasoning about moral blameworthiness and mistaken referents. Booklet 2 additionally includes items that assess understanding of sarcasm, lies, and second-order belief-desire reasoning. Compared to other ToM tasks, the booklet task provides relatively dense sampling of ToM reasoning within each child (Booklet 1: 41 items; Booklet 2: 65 items). Experimental sessions were video recorded and data were coded offline; the open dataset consists of children's accuracy (binary) on each item and, for many children (n = 171), transcriptions of free responses. The dataset also includes children's scores on standardized tests of receptive language and non-verbal IQ, as well as other demographic information. As such, this dataset is a valuable resource for investigating the development of ToM reasoning in early and middle childhood

The Double-edged Sword of Pedagogy: Modeling the Effect of Pedagogical Contexts on Preschoolers’ Exploratory Play

URL to paper from conference siteHow does explicit instruction affect exploratory play and learning? We present a model that captures pedagogical assumptions (adapted from Shafto and Goodman, 2008) and test the model with a novel experiment looking at 4-year-olds’ exploratory play in pedagogical and non-pedagogical contexts. Our findings are consistent with the model predictions: preschool children limit their exploration in pedagogical contexts, spending most of their free play performing only the demonstrated action. By contrast, children explore broadly both at baseline and after an accidental demonstration. Thus pedagogy constrains children’s exploration for better and for worse; children learn the demonstrated causal relationship but are less likely than children in non-pedagogical contexts to discover and learn other causal relationships.American Psychological Foundation (Elizabeth Munsterberg Koppitz Fellowship)Templeton FoundationJames S. McDonnell Foundatio

Preschool-aged children can use communicators' influence on others to infer what they know

How do we know what others know? Prior work has focused on our early-emerging ability to infer the knowledge of single agents. Yet we often infer others’ knowledge by observing interactions between agents. In particular, the ability to reason about what communicators know can help children identify knowledgeable teachers. The present study investigates whether preschool-aged children infer what communicators know from how their communication influences listeners. Children observed two scenarios where a listener failed to activate a toy before succeeding. In the Effective-Communicator scenario, a speaker spoke nonsense language to a listener after they failed but before they succeeded. In the Ineffective- Communicator scenario, a speaker spoke to a listener before they initially failed. By around age 5, children preferred the one in the Effective- Communicator scenario when asked which speaker knows how the toy works. These results suggest young children can infer communicators’ knowledge solely from the presence of communication and its influence on others

From Exploration to Instruction: Children Learn From Exploration and Tailor Their Demonstrations to Observers’ Goals and Competence

This study investigated whether children learn from exploration and act as effective informants by providing informative demonstrations tailored to observers’ goals and competence. Children (4.0–6.9 years, N = 98) explored a causally ambiguous toy to discover its causal structure and then demonstrated the toy to a naive observer. Children provided more costly and informative evidence when the observer wanted to learn about the toy than observe its effects (Experiment 1) and when the observer was ordinary than exceptionally intelligent (Experiment 2). Relative to the evidence they generated during exploration, children produced fewer, less costly actions when the observer wanted or needed less evidence. Children understand the difference between acting‐to‐learn and acting‐to‐inform; after learning from exploration, they consider others’ goals and competence to provide “uninstructed instruction”.National Science Foundation (Grant CCF‐1231216